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THIS paper is concerned with institutional or organizational deter-
minants of directions of research and development activity. In
Western industrial societies, R and D of many kinds is carried out in
a variety of different society-wide institutional settings. For example,
the National Science Foundation distinguishes four major R and D
sectors: industry; colleges and universities; other nonprofit institu-
tions; and federal government agencies. In addition, each of these
sectors includes several subsystems. If we want to understand the
determinants of directions of R and D, we need to understand how
these different institutional systems operate and how they are inter-
related to form an overall system.
With the recent increase of interest in R and D has come a consider-
able increase in quantitative data about R and D and in descriptions
of relevant institutions. But, except for work on industrial R and D
making use of economic theory,1 there seems to be relatively little
effort to formulate systematic notions about how the institutional
subsystems operate. It seems to me that even crude "models" of the
other R and D subsystems would serve two useful functions at this
stage of our study. They would serve as guides in selecting important
questions for empirical research. And they would serve as a basis
for developing more rigorous and sophisticated theories.
The particular aim of this paper is to present some preliminary
ideas about the workings of four R and D subsystems: "pure"
academic natural science research, academic medical research,
academic engineering research, and government agricultural research.
These were chosen because they differ from one another and from the
market-patent system. Therefore, they may suggest something of the
NOTE: I want to thank Jacob Schmookler, Scott Maynes and, especially, Joseph
Spengler for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The defects remaining are
mtne atone. Much of the work was done white at the Research Center in Economic
Development and Cultural Change, the University of Chicago.
1RichardR. Nelson, "The Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature,"
JournalofBusiness, Vol. 32, 1959, pp. 101—127 and, by the same author, "The Simple
Economics of Basic Scientific Research," Journal of Political Economy,Vol. 67, 1959,
pp. 297—306.
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variety of the institutional arrangements which affect R and D. The
sketches are presented as hypotheses, not proven facts, and prelimin-
ary hypotheses at that.
Certain limitations of the discussion need to be mentioned at the
outset. First, my concern is with determinants of directions of R and
D activity within each subsystem. No effort is made to discuss the
factors which influence the total amount of funds made available to
each subsystem. Second, 1 have made the assumption that the outside
groups and organizations that finance much of the research in the
academic subsystems discussed do not have major net effects on the
directions of research within these systems. This begs a question which
is the subject of considerable contemporary debate, especially with
reference to government financing. However, 1 believe the assumption
is a useful first approximation. Moreover, I think improving our
understanding of the internal workings of the academic subsystems
is a necessary step in developing ways of empirically determining the
role of outside subsidizers.
Academic Science Research
The first example of a society-wide R and D subsystem I would like to
discuss is that of "pure" or theoretical natural science research as
carried out in universities. The distinguishing feature of "pure"
scientific research is the aim of advancing knowledge and gaining
deeper understanding for its own sake. More work has probably been
done on developing a picture of how academic science functions as a
system than on any other nonindustrial R and D subsystem. This
provides exceedingly helpful guides. in particular, I am much indebted
to Polanyi for many of the ideas used here.2
My procedure is first to outline some of the crucial features of the
institutional setting of academic science. 1 then try to show, in a simpli-
fied way, how these features lead to an over-all pattern of allocation
of personnel and resources among different lines of research within
academic science. Next I discuss the particular content of the scientific
values used in judging the scientific significance of substantive re-
search work. Finally, I discuss factors that influence the production
within academic science of knowledge useful as inputs to further
research rather than as "final outputs."
2MichaelPolanyi, Science, Faith and Society, Oxford, 1946; ,TheLogic of Liberty,
Chicago, 1951; ,Persona! Knowledge, Chicago,1958.
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INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND OPERATION
Certain features of the university setting of academic science seem
especially important in influencing directions of research. The first
important feature is the acceptance by influential segments of modern
Western societies of the idea that a major function of universities is the
advancement of knowledge. In "national" universities, in which the
great bulk of scientific research takes place, the faculty, the adminis-
trators, and the trustees are concerned with advancing the reputation
of their institutions as centers of scientific and scholarly investigation.
Departments in major universities are similarly concerned with their
reputations, which depend primarily on the excellence of the research
carried out by department members. For this reason, a major deter-
minant of appointment and advancement in a science department is
the publication of research of scientific significance.
A second major feature of the university setting is the fact that the
accepted judges of the merit of published scientific research—of the
extent to which it advances knowledge—are professional colleagues
throughout the country (and abroad) and especially those "univer-
sally recognized as the most eminent."3 Professional opinion and
advice are relied on in making decisions about university appoint-
ments.4 Moreover, foundation and government research funds are
usually allocated on the basis of advisory judgments by professional
scientists concerning the probable scientific worth of research pro-
posals submitted.
A final feature of importance is the freedom or autonomy granted
the individual university faculty member to use the time he has avail-
able and the personnel and facilities he is able to obtain to conduct
the research he wants to carry out.
These institutional features obviously influence the directions of
academic science research. Their effect is to allocate personnel and
resources among lines of research in a way that tends to "maximize"
the expected scientific significance of the results obtained, subject
to the constraints imposed by the availability of funds, personnel,
and other resources. This effect is brought about in the following way.
Each academic scientist working in his specialty and motivated by a
concern for his academic career if by nothing else, will pursue those
Polanyi, TheLogic of Liberty, p. 54.
See Eric Ashby, Technology and the Academics, London, 1958, for a good discussion
of how university academic government works in the British Commonwealth.
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lines of research which he expects will yield the most significant re-
sults. Results are published and discussed, and their scientific merit
evaluated by professional colleagues in the specialty. As reputations
are established, academic departments, striving to enhance their
standing in their disciplines, will try to appoint or promote those
scientists pursuing especially successful lines of work. Scientists
advising on the granting of fellowships and grants-in-aid will behave
similarly. These actions perform a twofold function. They reinforce
the goal of advancing knowledge by tangibly rewarding productive
scientists with income, tenure, academic rank, prestige, and profession-
al influence. In addition, departments trying to attract promising
scientists will offer such advantages as increased time for research,
access to more and better graduate students and technical assistants,
better library and other research facilities, interested and competent
colleagues, etc. Such competition within and between departments
means that the more productive scientists in a specialty obtain better
research conditions than do others. This tends to increase the output
of scientifically significant results obtainable from given resources.
Similar forces within academic science shift resources between
specialties within each discipline. Departments will tend to seek
scientists in specialties that are yielding especially exciting results. In
addition, graduate students will be attracted to such specialties. Estab-
lished scientists in "active" specialties usually will be able to obtain
more than average funds for supporting the training and research
of graduate students. Moreover, they will be able to point to the
wider career opportunities in such specialties as compared to those
judged less promising. In these ways, trained personnel (and facilities)
in a discipline are shifted toward those specialties which appear to
be the most scientifically productive at a given time. Obviously, this
also tends to increase the scientific significance of the research results
obtained with the funds available to the discipline.
Finally, there are also forces in academic science that tend to in
crease the proportion of research resources available to active discip-
lines as compared to that available to disciplines where work of less
scientific promise is going on. Scientists of one discipline will tend to
exaggerate its scientific importance relative to others, and there are
obvious incentives for each discipline to try to obtain as large an
amount of funds as possible. The resolution of these conflicting claims
for research support, insofar as they are resolved within the system of
academic science, falls on persons in positions where they need to
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consider the over-all scientific significance of different possible uses
of resources—persons responsible for decisions affecting a whole
division, school, college, or university. They have incentives to move
resources to disciplines where work of high scientific significance
appears possible. In addition, to academic science are
more likely to select careers in rapidly advancing disciplines than in
those that are comparatively stagnant.
Al! these institutional arrangements result in a system which tends
to maximize the expected scientific value of the research done with
available resources. The scientific value of research results is judged
by scientists themselves and these judgments, operating through the
institutions discussed, are the means by which the community of
academic scientists governs itself, insofar as this is true, it is clear
that we need to understand the standards, criteria, preferences, or
principles which are used by scientists in judging the scientific value
of research proposals and results.5 On what basis are some results
deemed important and exciting while others are judged to be insigni-
ficant and not worth following up? Working out ways of studying
this question empirically appears to be a crucial step in advancing our
knowledge of the determinants of the directions of academic science
research. In the following section 1 want to discuss this aspect of the
subsystem of academic science further.
JUDGING SCIENTIFIC VALUE IN ACADEMIC SCIENCE
Judgments of the scientific significance of research in academic science
have certain general features that need to be kept in mind. First, there
is great uncertainty in scientific research—it is really a search into the
unknown. This means that judgments are tentative estimates or
guesses which are needed in making decisions, even though they may
turn out to be wrong after the fact. Second, the criteria or standards
used in judging scientific research are largely implicit. Such explicit
formulations as exist are maxims or pointers, not precise criteria that
can be routinely applied by any appropriately trained person. It is
generally recognized among scientists that some persons are far better
judges than others.6 Third, even though there is a common core of
values in the traditions of science to which scientists appeal in sup-
porting theirjudgments, it is recognized that consensus is by no means
To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that the term "value" is used here in the
general sense of "utility" or "use value," and not, as is usual in economics, in the sense of
exchange valueor price.
6See Polanyi's remarks about Rutherford (Science,Faith and Soc/ely, pp. 76—77).
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always possible in particular cases. What one scientist thinks will be
promising may be regarded as useless by others. When disagreements
arise, scientists are formally free to follow their own judgment and
attempt to demonstrate through further research the validity of their
ideas.
All this puts the student who wants to understand the selection
of directions of academic scientific research in a difficult position.
Essentially his problem is to develop testable propositions about how
directions of research vary with circumstances from qualitative in-
formation about the way scientists make judgments. In this section I
want to discuss some of the criteria that seem to be operative in scien-
tific decisions in an effort to suggest some of the kinds of systematic
empirical research which would be useful in increasing our under-
standing of the directions taken by research in academic science.
We may begin by dividing judgments of the value of proposed or
published scientific contributions into two kinds. On the one hand,
there are judgments concerning the value of substantive contributions
to science—direct contributions to knowledge of the subject matter
under investigation. They are the scientific discoveries of empirical
facts, regularities, concepts, and theories which take their place in
the textbooks which summarize what is known. In addition to these
"final outputs" of scientific research, there are other contributions
whose significance lies primarily in their role as aids to further research.
They serve primarily as knowledge "inputs" rather than as final out-
puts. Let us discuss these two kinds of evaluation, in order.
Evaluationof Substantive Contributions
Ibelieve the most useful statement of the criteria used in judging
substantive contributions in academic science is that of Michael
Polanyi.7 Let us consider the criteria used to judge contributions on
a given subject, and then discuss how findings in different fields may
be compared.
Within a given subject-matter field, Polanyi thinks two criteria are
of primary importance: (1) the precision, accuracy or certainty of a
contribution; and (2) its systematic relevance or profundity—the
breadth of its coverage and the variety of its implications.8 These
Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty and Personal Knowledge. Schwab, dealing with a
somewhat different problem, has developed an interesting set of distinctions which could
also be used for this purpose (Joseph J. Schwab, "What Do Scientists Do ?"Behavioral
Science, Vol. 5, 1960, pp. 1—27).
8Polanyi,Personal Knowledge, pp. 135—136.
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criteria "apply jointly, so that deficiency in one is largely compensated
for by excellence in the others."9 A contribution which is very accurate
and reliable but very narrow in its scope may be valued as highly as a
contribution which is less precise but more general. Such judgments
are made on the basis of the knowledge available at the time. They may
be drastically altered as a result of changes in the state of knowledge.
Consider the precision measurement of atomic weights.'° At one time,
the atomic weights of the elements were thought to be important
clues to the basic nature of matter. Later, the discovery of isotopes
showed that this was not so, that the important weights were isotopic
masses. Precision work that was awarded a Nobel prize in 1914 was
thought to be of little interest by 1932.
The relative importance accorded these two values thus becomes an
important factor affecting the directions of scientific research. Re-
sponses to new knowledge may provide a way of estimating the weight
given these values. One would expect that in a discipline or scientific
tradition which evaluated precision• highly, research would change
markedly in response to the discovery of new ways of achieving greater
precision, but not shift very much with discoveries affecting the system-
atic relevance of findings. Conversely, in disciplines or traditions
where systematic relevance is given the greater weight, an opposite
pattern of response to changes in knowledge would be expected. Com-
parative studies of responses to the same or similar changes in know-
ledge should enable us to empirically document the role of these
values in various fields of science. Moreover, such studies would
provide tests of the extent to which these values account for the selec-
tion of lines of research in particular fields.
Let us now ask how contributions of equivalent precision and system-
atic relevance in different subject-matter fields are compared. Here,
Polanyi thinks a third criterion operates, the criterion of "intrinsic
interest." Some subjects are just more interesting than others, apart
from any relation they may have to practical concerns. To quote
Polanyi:
In science, as in ordinary perception, our attention is attracted
by things that are useful or dangerous to us, even though they
present themselves less distinctly and coherently. This sets up a
competition between practical and theoretical interests.... But
0Ibid.,p.136.
'° ibid.,p. 136.
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things are also interesting in themselves, and their intrinsic
interest varies greatly. Living animals are more interesting than
their dead bodies; a dog more interesting than a fly; a man more
interesting than a dog.1'
Thus, insofar as academic science is "pure" science, concerned with
knowledge for its own sake, intrinsic interest is the guiding criterion
in evaluating the scientific value of similar contributions to our
knowledge of different subjects. We here encounter the long debated
issue of the influence of practical or utilitarian values on directions
of academic science research. Polanyi's distinction between practical
and intrinsic interest in a subject suggests ways this problem might
be studied empirically.
Polanyi appears to assume that everyonejudges the intrinsic interest
of various subjects in the same way. However, it seems likely that
there are cultural and subcultural differences in the amount of intrinsic
interest accorded particular subjects. But, if such cultural differences
exist, it also seems probable that they would manifest themselves in
relatively stable differences in the proportion of effort devoted to the
same scientific subjects in different societies. Practical interests, on
the contrary, can be expected to change rapidly even in a single society
and to differ from society to society in ways that are correlated with
extrascientific conditions which can be studied. Practical interest in
particular military, agricultural, industrial, or medical problems
certainly exhibit such variations. Therefore, it ought to be possible to
study the role practical interests play in the selection of lines of re-
search by studying empirically the extent to which directions of re-
search vary and shift with differences and changes in conditions affect-
ing practical interests. Such study is complicated by the fact that the
state of knowledge, or what Cohen calls the scientific also
changes rapidly and, as we have seen, also affects directions of re-
search. However, it should be possible to distinguish the effects of
these different kinds of changes.
We thus have the picture of the "pure" scientific significance of
substantive contributions to academic science being judged according
to some weighted total of their precision, systematic relevance, and
intrinsic interest. In addition, practical interests may also play a role
in judging the value of research results. The possible role of practical
"Ibid., p.138.
12 1. BernardCohen, Science,ServantofMan, Boston,1948,pp. 3 1—32.
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interests raises another problem that requires explicit discussion. We
have assumed so far that the only role practical interests play in aca-
demic science is possibly giving greater weight or importance to the
scientific study of certain topics than they otherwise would have. We
have assumed that practical interest in a subject does not alter the
scientific character of the research done. However, it is relatively easy
to show that practical interest in a subject can also alter the direction
taken by the research. This possibility is clearly seen in industrial
"basic research" in examples such as the following. Shell Development
undertook a study of the mechanisms of hydrocarbon oxidation.13
This is a theoretical or scientific subject, but was picked because the
phenomena were important in Shell operations. In the course of this
work discoveries were made concerning the role of hydrogen peroxide.
Since hydrogen peroxide was a commercially interesting substance,
the focus of the research shifted to the study of reactions that would
produce it in larger yields. That work, in turn, led to still other com-
mercial production methods. Thus, even though the research appar-
ently started out as a scientific study, it was really not that. Rather, it
was a strategy for making inventions; a way of uncovering clues from
which useful processes or products could be developed. Gershinowitz
comments as follows:
In the large sense there can be no such thing as undirected research
in industry. It may start out thus, but essentially it is directed into
types of activity that the managers of that research laboratory
have confidence will some time have application. Therefore, I
think it is very important that there shall be somewhere a place in
the research setup of the nation where really undirected investiga-
tion can take place. Here a man who is working on the kinetics
of oxidation of hydrocarbons will not be distracted into studying
the kinetics of reactions to make hydrogen peroxide. Here he will
continue to work on what he began and let only the results of his
own activities determine the direction he wants to go.'4
In cases like this, practical interest in a scientific subject turns the
investigation into a search for practically useful clues. This is not
13HaroldGershinowitz, "Industrial Research Methods and Industrial Research
Programs as Affecting Academic Research," Changing Paiterns of Academic Research,
Sigma Xi, Rensselaer Chapter, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1957.
ibid.,p. 21.
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what Polanyi calls technically justified science, in which the aim is
deeper understanding of a subject of practical interest.15 Instead it is
a way of making inventions by doing enough scientific investigation
to uncover useful new ideas which then become the center of attention.
Such research ought to be called something like exploratory science-
invention to distinguish it from technically justified science. Explora-
tory science-invention leads to some advances in general knowledge
but these are likely to be limited, since work is continually diverted
to the exploration of practical possibilities.
Thus, in examining the role of practical interests in academic
science, we need to know how such interests affect the relative amount
of work done in various subject-matter fields and the extent to which
research becomes exploratory science-invention instead of technically
justified science. How much exploratory science-invention is carried
out in academic science will depend on a number of institutional
factors. It will depend, for example, on the extent to which investi-
gators are rewarded for advancing scientific knowledge, apart from
any useful clues they may uncover, as compared with the attention
given findings of direct practical relevance. It will also depend on
how committed researchers are to a scientific career. If an aca-
demic chemist, for example, is not strongly committed to science, he
may select lines of research that promise practically significant
findings which would make him an attractive employee in industrial
research.
It seems clear that unless thecommunity of academic scientists is
strongly committed to the importance of advancing knowledge and
is supported in this commitment by significant segments of the larger
society, this goal will not be fully affective in guiding the direction of
research. it is possible, for example, that the apparently greater value
placed on the humanistic search for truth and the academic life in
Europe as compared to the United States has something to do with
the apparently greater output of high quality science there. There
certainly is evidence that it is very difficult to transplant academic
science effectively to countries where its values and traditions are not
understood.'6 Careful comparative study of the attention devoted to
selected lines of research in different countries might enable us to
document and test empirically these impressions.
Polanyl,Personal Know/edge, p. 179.
'°Ibid.,p. 182; also Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty, p. 56.
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Knowledge Capital in Academic Science
So far we have discussed only standards used to evaluate sub-
stantive contributions as final outputs of academic science research.
Butresearchalso produces kinds of knowledge whose significance
does not lie in their contribution to knowledge of the subject being
investigated but rather in the usefulness of such knowledge in under-
taking further research. This is true of the development of new scien-
tific such as the cyclotron; of new methods of chemical
analysis, physical measurement, or observation; of new methods of
experimental design, manipulation, and control, and so on. Moreover,
certain kinds of background research produce knowledge which is
chiefly useful as an aid to research.17 Cohen mentions the usefulness
in organic analysis and synthesis of the vast collection of data on
melting and boiling points and similar properties of countless organic
compounds.'8
Knowledge that is useful as an input to further research can be
thought of as knowledge capital. An addition to the stock of knowledge
capital aids further research by opening up new possibilities or by
reducing the cost or time required to explore already existing possi-
bilities. From this point of view, it is clear that substantive contribu-
tions can serve as knowledge capital as well as final outputs. Fruitful
substantive contributions are precisely those which seem to open up
new significant research possibilities.
All of this means that to understand the selection of directions of
academic science research we must understand how the capital value
as well as the substantive value of research results are judged. The
basic logic used goes something like this. First, an effort is made to
estimate the net additions to substantive knowledge which are likely
to be produced in the forseeable future as a result of the knowledge
capital contribution being evaluated. Then the scientific significance
of these expected additions is estimated and imputed to the knowledge
capital and to the research that produced it. In other words, an effort
is made to judge the significance of an addition to knowledge capital
by estimating its expected net effect on the output of substantive
scientific results in the near future. It is obvious that such estimates
are difficult to make, that scientists will often disagree, and that the
estimates will often turn out to be wrong. But at least rough judgments
Cohen, op. cit., p. 53.
18Ibid.,p. 252.
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have to be made if work on scientifically useful aids to research is to be
promoted, and a reasonable guess is better than nothing at all.
Furthermore, as time goes on and the impact of a given piece of re-
search can be assessed on the basis of more evidence, evaluations of
additions to knowledge capital can be corrected and the rewards to
scientists producing them changed accordingly.
It follows from this argument that the producer of knowledge capital
as well as the producer of results of substantive significance will tend
to benefit privately according to the social benefits to science which
stem from his work. Within the subsystem of academic science there
appears to be no external economy problem comparable to that which
Nelson has pointed out in the case of "basic" research carried out by
firms in a market-patent system.'9 Probably the best way to test these
notions empirically and to increase our knowledge of the determinants
of research devoted to the production of knowledge capital would
be to compare work on similar research aids in academic science and
other subsystems such as private industrial research.
CONCLUSIONS
If the preceeding picture of the way the subsystem of academic science
operates is a useful first approximation, it suggests that a key problem
in understanding the selection of directions of scientific research is
obtaining better knowledge of the scientific values or criteria used in
making professional evaluations of the significance of different lines
of research. This seems to require the study of the way decisions vary
with differences in relevant circumstances such as the state of know-
ledge, practical interests, institutional organization, etc. The discus-
sion attempted to suggest ideas which would be useful in the design
of such research.
Academic Medical Research
I now turn to some of the Rand D subsystems devoted to the improve-
ment of practical arts. Practical arts are concerned with the achieve-
ment of useful results. It is usefulness in actual practice under a
particular set of prevailing conditions relative to available alterna-
tives that is the basic test of advances in a practical art. Meeting such
specifications gives to technology and its improvement a character
and complexity significantly different from that of pure science. How-
ever, in the absence of a really adequate analysis of the kinds of
19Nelson,"The Simple EconomicsofBasic Scientific Research."
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knowledge involved in the improvement of a practical art, the follow-
ing discussion will be limited to features that emerge in making broad
institutional comparisons.
The first example of a R and D subsystem devoted to improving the
practical arts to be considered is academic medical research. By
academic medical research I mean the research activities of full-time
or part-time staff members of medical schools and teaching or other
hospitals who, in addition to teaching and often providing medical
services, also engage in medical research. Included is a broad spectrum
of R and D activities. They range from clinical research concerned
with the introduction, testing, and improvement of specific advances
in medical practice on through experimental and clinical studies
devoted to uncovering useful new leads, to the research carried out in
the so-called preclinical medical sciences such as anatomy, physiology,
bacteriology, biochemistry, etc.
Let us first examine some of the important features of the institu-
tional organization of academic medical research to see what clues
we can get concerning determinants of the direction of research
activity in this subsystem. To a considerable degree, the institutional
arrangements are like those of academic science. First, academic medi-
cal research is largely subsidized from outside the system in the same
ways that academic science is. Second, the prestige of medical schools
and associated institutions depends to a considerable extent on the
reputation they build up as contributors to the advancement of the
medical arts and sciences. Third, donors of funds and administrators
generally defer to professional judgments of the value of medical
research results and follow medical advice in the allocation of funds.
Fourth, established academic medical investigators are given autono-
my to decide what lines of research they want to pursue with the
means they are able to obtain. Therefore, persons following a research
career in medicine are in a situation where they have incentives to
do research that will be considered significant by professional opinion.
However, some workers in academic medical research are in an
institutional position that differs significantly from that of the typical
academic pure scientist. It appears that many of the positions in
clinical departments in medical schools and teaching hospitals are
part-time positions or positions in which the incumbent is allowed to
practice for fees and to retain at least a portion of the fees earned.20
20MedicalResearch: A Mideentury Survey, Boston, Little, Brown for the American
Foundation, 1955, Vol. 1, pp. 214 if.
421ORGANIZATION AND R AND D DECISION MAKING
Anyone thus employed has a stake in a private practice and is not
necessarily committed solely to a research career. So long as he per-
forms his official functions well enough to retain his position, it is
possible for him to orient his research along lines significant for his
practice. He could focus his work on attempts to make improvements
in medical practice that would enhance his reputation as a practitioner
and thus his income derived from practice. Such economic incentives
could operate even if, as is the case in medicine, professional standards
dictate prompt and full publication of research findings and open
access to the knowledge and use of new techniques. A reputation as
an originator and longer experience with a new procedure may attract
fee paying patients even when an innovation has become widely
diffused. Similar incentives to direct research toward improvements
which attract fee paying patients could also operate on an institutional
level. Clinics, out-patient departments, and hospitals affiliated with
medical schools may seek to attract patients who will improve their
budgetary position, and research workers associated with such insti-
tutions could be given incentives to direct their activities in such
directions also.
Within the constraints that regulate access to medical research
funds and positions and that control medical practice, there is probably
a certain amount of academic medical research oriented toward the
financial benefit of the investigator or the institution with which he
is affiliated. The extent and significance of such influences on the
selection of lines of research can only be ascertained when methods
have been developed for distinguishing such research from that select-
ed on other bases. Crucial to such study would be a determination of
the kinds of medical advances that attract financially rewarding
patients and the kinds of improvements that have no significant effect
of this sort. That distinction would provide a framework for detailed
empirical study to see what effect, if any, this difference has on the
allocation of effort to lines of research.
My impression is that most academic medical research is focused
on obtaining results that will be judged highly by the profession and
not on direct financial gain. In this context the key question is what
criteria are used to judge the medical significance and value of ad-
vances in the medical arts and sciences. Two general possibilities sug-
gest themselves. On the one hand, the traditions of medicine are those
of a service profession devoted to meeting the medical needs of the
people it serves. Insofar as these traditions govern the evaluation of
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research, medical advances would be judged according to their sig-
nificance in meeting the medical needs of society. On the other hand,
given the position of academic medical research as a major research
arm of a profession whose practitioners obtain income by providing
services to the public, there is the possibility that medical advances
could be judged according to their significance in economically bene-
fiting the profession as a whole. I doubt whether the economic criterion
is very significant. It is difficult to see how most medical advances
significantly increase the average income of the medical profession.
Professional policies in other areas, such as those affecting the number
of medical practitioners, seem much more important. Furthermore,
pressures from the lay public and from subsidizers of medical research
tend to reinforce the traditions within medicine stressing the pre-
eminence of meeting the medical needs of the public. It therefore
appears likely that professional standards for judging the significance
of advances in medical knowledge stress the extent to which advances
enhance the ability of the profession to meet its social obligations.
The question then becomes, what professional criteria are used to
judge the extent to which an improvement helps in meeting public
medical needs? A number of criteria are often mentioned in this con-
nection, such as amount of reduction in mortality rates, in morbidity
rates, in average duration of illness, in severity of aftereffects, in
amount of suffering, and so forth. These and other more specific
criteria appear to derive from general social values in Western soci-
eties. However, so far as I know, little study has been made of how
these criteria or others are used in professional medical judgments of
improvements in the art. In particular, we do not know the relative
weights given various criteria in reaching over-all judgments. There is
evidence of the use of the kinds of criteria mentioned. For example,
the Steelman report which is based, at least in part, on professional
medical advice includes the following statement: "...ifthe Federal
Government is financing a broad program of medical research, the
problems under investigation should bear a reasonably close relation
to those causes of illness and death which are most common in the
population and in which the public, therefore, has the greatest
stake."2'
How far and in what ways such criteria guide professional judg-
ments and decisions concerning directions of academic medical
21 R.Steelman, The Nation's Medical Research, Vol. 5 of Scienceand Public
Policy, Washington, 1947, p. 86.
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research are questions clearly needing study. In modern times, due
to demographic changes and to changes in the medical arts themselves,
the importance of various diseases as causes of illness, death, suffering,
etc. has often changed radically. Systematic empirical study of the
effects of such changes on the directions of academic medical research
ought to shed considerable light on what criteria are used and the
relative importance accorded different indices of medical need. In
such a study, the effect of changes in medical knowledge on expected
costs of making comparable advances in different medical fields
would have to be taken into account. One would not expect that
resources would be aflocated to research on diseases in direct propor-
tion to the severity of the medical problems they present. Such an
allocation would not take into account differences in the expected
difficulty and cost of making comparable improvements in the pre-
vention or treatment of different diseases. Expected costs obviously
vary greatly from disease to disease and change as the state of medical
knowledge changes. These facts complicate the study of the criteria
used to evaluate the importance of different lines of academic medical
research, but I doubt if the difficulties are insurmountable.
The professional standards and values used to judge the probable
medical importance of specific advances in medical practice can be
used directly in making decisions about the importance of research
on particular medical problems. They can also be used to evaluate
alternative lines of exploratory science-invention. The question of the
allocation of resources to technically justified medical sciences and
to fields within them seems to me to raise additional issues. I suspect
empirical study would show that much of the academic medical
research within the preclinical disciplines (e.g. anatomy, physiology,
biochemistry, and even bacteriology, pathology, and pharmacology)
is carried out as technically justified science. That is to say, much of
the research in these fields is concentrated on gaining a deeper general
understanding of the subjects studied and not on obtaining clues of
direct practical significance. These fields are professionally organized,
have their own journals, and their own foci of interest. We should be
able to test this guess by studying how directions of research in the
preclinical medical sciences vary in response to changes in knowledge
opening up new lines of scientific study as compared with their re-
sponse to changes in the importance of practical medical problems
related to their subject matter fields.
If the preclinical medical disciplines do function to a considerable
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extent as technically justified sciences, how do we account for their
elaborate development and for their ability to maintain a strongly
scientific as against a practical orientation? Theoretically, one might
argue that research in these fields is supported on the basis of some
estimate of the average long-run rate of production of knowledge of
practical medical significance; and that their scientific orientation is
supported as a necessary condition for obtaining the particular kind
of practically significant knowledge they produce. Nowadays many
of the arguments for supporting basic research, including academic
science, are of this sort.
However, the difficulty so often encountered in practical fields in
generating support for activities that produce long-run, uncertain,
broad, and difficult-to-trace benefits suggests that additional factors
are involved. One possibility is that part of the support is based on
the intrinsic interest of the phenomena studied in the medical sciences.
This possibility could be explored by detailed study of the attention
paid to specific topics relative to the prospects of practically significant
findings and the prospects of precise and systematically coherent
results. A major sign of intrinsic interest in a subject is support of
research on it in the absence of practical implications and in the face
of inability to produce as precise or profound findings as are possible
in other fields. In addition, it seems probable that there has developed
within medicine and among groups concerned with the support of med-
ical research the conviction that scientific understanding of the art
is a good thing in the long run for the profession, apart from any
effort to assess practical benefits relative to costs. Wide variations
appear to exist among the practical arts in the importance attached
to understanding of the scientific principles involved. Though such
variations may reflect the different practical benefits derived from
advances in related scientific knowledge, I doubt if this fully accounts
for the facts. Systematic comparison of the development of technically
justified science research auxiliary to medicine with that related to
agriculture, mining, metal working and other industrial fields would
shed light on this question.
To sum up, the subsystem of academic medical research as a system
for improving a practical art appears to have a number of distinctive
characteristics. For example, it differs from industrial research in its
orientation toward meeting medical needs rather than market de-
mand; in its open publication of findings; in the absence of intra-
industry external economy problems; and in the development of
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special traditions supporting technically justified medical sciences.
The reality of these characteristics and their effects on directions of
research could be studied most directly in cases where similar kinds
of medical research are carried out both within the academic sub-
system and by pharmaceutical houses and surgical or other medical
supply firms.
Academic Engineering Research
In this section I want to discuss only one question concerning aca-
demic engineering research suggested by comparisons with academic
medical research. By academic engineering research I mean the re-
search carried out in engineering schools, institutes of technology
and related applied science departments. Unlike the situation in
medicine, by far the largest amount of research on specific practical
problems in engineering is done by firms operating in the market-
patent system.22 Despite this fact, it appears that technically justified
engineering sciences receive less academic support than comparable
medical sciences. An exploration of this problem may provide leads
concerning additional institutional factors affecting research in R
and D subsystems concerned with the improvement of practical arts.
Finch provides an interesting summary of the difference between
academic medical and engineering research in the United States:
In engineering, as in the case of medicine, the work of natural
scientists has never provided all the scientific knowledge and un-
derstandings which are essential to continued professional growth.
In engineering the practical mechanics of heat (engineering ther-
modynamics), of electrical machines and circuits, of liquids and
gases (hydraulics and fluid mechanics), of solids (elasticity and
strength of materials), more recently of soils, foundations, and
earth structures (soil these and other basic engin-
eering studies were, over a century ago, designated by the Ger-
mans as engineering science. They were based to be sure on the
facts of natural science, but they have been developed by engin-
eers in directions, scope, and understandings which would
not claim the interest, time, and efforts of workers in pure
science. Exactly the same situation has existed in the medical
field, but here the scope, function, and importance of medical
22Fora review of work on industrial research see Nelson, "The Economics of
Invention: A Survey of the Literature."
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science is well understood and fully recognized. American engin-
eering, on the other hand, faces today the task of making equally
clear the place and importance in technological progress of
research in engineering science.23
A corollary of this underemphasis on engineering science in U.S.
academic engineering research is a greater emphasis than one might
expect on specific practical problems like those dealt with in industry
and on the study of such problems in an empirical, practically ori-
ented way. Let me again quote Finch:
many problems of engineering research involve the study and
analysis of various forms, devices, structural or machine units,
as well as a scientific explanation for physical, chemical, or other
phenomena encountered in engineering practice. These are not
necessarily development or industrial research problems, though
they may arise in the activities of industry....Unfortunately,
however, such activities can very easily deteriorate into mere
routine testing or empirical formula or coefficient hunting which
may have little or no value in extending the frontiers of engineer-
ing knowledge and should seldom be referred to as research.24
There is still other evidence that U.S. academic engineering research
has tended to be empirically rather than theoretically oriented. There
is historical evidence that we borrowed from Europe when engineer-.
ing practice itself required increased use of theoretically based
methods. Finch notes:
Just before World War I some German books on stress
analysis and similar subjects began to attract special attention.
But the fact that the state of American engineering science was
not all it should be and that American engineers were ill pre-
pared to cope with the new problems which were becoming of
importance is reflected very clearly in the rapid rise to promin-
ence of numerous newcomers to our shores whose education had
been acquired in Europe.25
My impression is that Europeans continue to play a significant
23JamesKip Finch, Engineering and Western Civilization,NewYork, 1951, p. 315.
24Finch,Trends inEngineering Education, NewYork, 1948, pp. 89—90.
25Finch,Trends inEngineering Education, p. 19.
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role in the more theoretical aspects of academic engineering teaching
and research. Finally, it may be noted that the increased importance
of theoretical knowledge in engineering since World War II has
resulted in a marked increase in the employmeni of mathematicians
and physicists by industry for both R and D and engineering practice.
This suggests that academic engineering training and research con-
tinues to lag behind the needs of practice.
The question then arises: what factors in the organization of U.S.
academic engineering account for this apparent underemphasis on
research in the engineering sciences? Two contributing factors may
be suggested. One is the stress academic engineering institutions
place on their function of providing services to local industry. Another
possibility is that professional standards in U.S. academic engineer-
ing, outside a few research oriented institutions, stress the importance
of immediately useful research results rather than more theoretical
advances. It has been said that the practical orientation of U.S.
engineering stemmed from a situation where the high cost of labor
relative to other costs resulted in a lack of emphasis on economical
use of materials and on precision of design.26 Though the problems
of engineering practice have been changing and are now changing
even faster,27 traditions based on the early situation have apparently
altered more slowly.
Another factor involved lies in the area of relations between
academic engineering and academic science. Wickenden describes the
efforts of German technical schools to obtain academic status com-
parable to that of other scientific institutions and to obtain the right
to grant a fully recognized research doctorate.28 This effort to estab-
lish fundamental research on technical subjects as a way of gaining
stature in the academic world apparently had much to do with the
development of the engineering sciences in Germany. Similar theoreti-
cal research interests on the part of academically trained engineers are
reported for England2° and Europe generally.3° Though that interest
26Ibid,,p.13.
27See,for example, Arthur R. von Hippel, Molecular Science and Molecular Engineer-
ing, New York, 1959.
28W.E. Wickenden, A Comparative Study of Engineering Education in the United
States and Europe, Society for the Promotion of Engineering Education, Bulletin No. 16,
1929.
29R.L. Meier, "Research as a Social Process," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 2,
1951, pp. 91—104.
The Organizationof Applied Research in Europe, The United Stares and Canada,
Vol. I, A Comparative Study, Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris,
1954.
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may have adverse effects on the practicality of the work done on
industrial problems (see above references), it undoubtedly contributes
to the development of technically justified engineering sciences. In
the cases cited, the concern of academic engineering groups with their
general academic status apparently stems from the stronger humanistic
interests and the higher status of scholarship prevalent in Europe
as compared with the United States.
We need to work out ways of testing empirically such impressions
concerning the possible effects of differences in academic engineering
traditions on the directions taken by academic engineering R and D.
Empirical comparisons of the attention devoted to engineering
sciences in different countries could be made. Differences between
fields within engineering, such as the older and newer fields,3' need to
be explored. Such studies would give us a basis forjudging empirically
the magnitude and nature of the differences in emphasis in various
spheres of academic engineering research. We would then be in a
position to study systematically the organizational, cultural, and other
factors influencing R and D decisions in academic engineering.
Go vernmen t Agricultural Research
I now turn to a different kind of R and D subsystem organized and
operating in a governmental rather than an academic setting. The
example chosen is governmental agricultural research as carried out
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and State agricultural experi-
ment stations.32 Like academic engineering, governmental agricultur-
al research services an industry operating in the price-market system.
However, in contrast to industrial firms, agricultural operators carry
out comparatively little research of their own so that government
research constitutes the major source of agricultural R and D except
in agricultural machinery and equipment, fertilizers, and insecticides
and so on, where industrial firms also play a role.
The directions taken by government agricultural research are influ-
enced by the organizational setting in which the research agencies
operate. The research units in the USDA are divisions within a
31 RupertMaclaurin,"Technological Progress in Some American Industries,"
AmericanEconomic Review, 1954, pp. 182—184.
32 For general background see: Carleton R. Federal, State and Local Administra-
tive Relations/ups inAgriculture,Berkeley, 1938; A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the
Federal Gavern,nent, Cambridge,I957; Alfred Charles True, A History of Agricultural
Experimentation and Research in the United Slates /607—1925, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Misc.publ. 251,1937.
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hierarchically organized federal government department while the
state experiment stations are state government agencies administered
by directors. It seems reasonable to assume that the heads of these
units, like the heads of most governmental agencies, are in a situation
where their own careers and their opportunities for performing
public services which they feel are important depend on their ability
to maintain and preferably to expand both the financial support and
the tasks assigned to their organizations. Government agencies are
usually concerned with developing that kind of support and influence
which is helpful both in the bargaining within and between govern-
ment departments during the budget making period and in the political
processes of getting legislative support for their programs and the
appropriation of funds to finance them. Fundamental to this objec-
tive is the political support of sizeable, politically influential segments
of the relevant electorate and their elected representatives.
A major way government agencies that provide services to a clien-
tele can develop public support is to supply especially desired services,
as agricultural research strongly oriented towards the needs of farmers.
Presumably, the main type of benefits desired by farmers from re-
search agencies are services that help them economically through
increasing their incomes. Therefore, government agricultural research
organizations will probably seek to maximize the economic benefits
to the industry of the work they are able to do within the budgetary,
administrative, and legislative constraints under which they operate.
T. W. Schultz, for example, argues that:
Undoubtedly other tastes and preferences, other than a "maximi-
zation" of economic value of the output enter into the decision
relations determining the director's choices. However, even a
casual look at the behavior patterns of directors in approving
research projects suggests that economic considerations, broadly
conceived and when taken over a span of years, are of primary
importance.
In addition, Schultz characterizes the results in the following way:
The political mechanism does not cut with a razor's edge; it is a
blunt contraption at best; and yet, it appears that in making
Theodore W. Schultz, The Economic Organization ofAgriculture, NewYork, 1953,
p.113.
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funds available for agricultural research, with all its imper-
fections, it compares favorably, for example, with the public and
private efforts that went into the settlement of the American
frontier.34
If the organization of government agricultural research can be
approximated by some such model, then certain consequences for
the way this R and D subsystem functions may be noted. Since research
is supported by public funds, research findings are made freely avail-
able to the public not only as information (as in the case of patents)
but also for use in practice by all farmers and farm firms. Further-
more, such agencies have strong incentives to communicate their
results fully and promptly and also to be sure that the results are
accurate and reliable. Competition among agencies, concern of re-
searchers for their careers, and the checks provided by farmers who
use recommended practices all tend to discipline the communication
of results more effectively than is the case when results are made avail-
able in the form of patent claims.35 Further, the position of the agencies
enables them to benefit (in the form of political support) from broadly
useful improvements they develop, whether patentable or not. Thus,
in their decisions about prospective benefits of lines of research, they
are able to take into account the social benefits of intraagricultural
(or at least intrastate intraagricultural) external economies in a way
that firms in a market-patent system are not able to do.36 In these
ways, the system of government agricultural research works like that
of academic medical research and differs from that of private industrial
research.
Government agricultural research, however, also differs from
academic medical research in ways that influence the directions of
R and D activity. In the first place, practical benefits to agriculture
are defined in essentially economic market oriented terms (subject
to the modifications resulting from strong governmental regulation
and subsidy) rather than in professional terms reflecting general
social values operating outside the market expression of consumer
demand. In short, government agricultural research services an
industry operating in a regulated price-market system, not a service
profess.ion like medicine which tends to provide services on a need
Ibid., p. 118.
On patents see the remarks of James B. Conant in Science and Common Sense, New
Haven, 1951, p. 331.
38Cf.Nelson, "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research."
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basis. In the second place, the socially or politically expressed demands
of the clientele on investigators appear to differ significantly in the
two research fields. In the case of medical needs, lay members of
society may express their interest in the solution of various medical
problems, but beyond that they generally defer to professional opinion
in decisions about what specific kinds of research ought to be done.
The situation appears to be different in agriculture. Many farmers are
skilled and often professionally trained practitioners of the arts of
agriculture; they are analogous to practicing physicians rather than
to patients. Therefore, they are likely to believe that they can evaluate
the significance of particular agricultural problems and decide the
kinds of research needed. They are likely to express their demands
for research services in highly specific terms. The result is that govern-
ment agricultural agencies may be forced to carry out the research
farmers think will benefit them most, rather than follow professional
judgments based on a wider acquaintance with scientific, technological,
economic, and other developments affecting agriculture.
Other features of the standards or criteria farmers use to evaluate
the research results provided them are also significant. It makes a
difference, for example, whether farmers judge the economic benefits
of research on the basis of results derived from recently received and
used improvements or on the basis of results obtained over a longer
period of time. If research directors feel that support for their work
depends on their responding immediately to each new crisis or prob-
lem that arises, their choice of lines of research will be largely limited
to specific projects capable of yielding benefits quickly. They will be
in a position analogous to that of business firms fighting for survival
who direct their R and D toward immediately useful improvements.
If, on the other hand, farmers realize the benefits of longer-term lines
of investigation on major unsolved problems, then research directors
are in a position where the politically feasible alternatives among which
they can choose are significantly broadened.
The support of long-term research would appear to depend on the
extent to which agricultural interests defer to the expert judgment of
investigators or defer to people in their own ranks who have made it
their business to become informed about the issues involved in deci-
sions about directions of agricultural research. This will also affect
expenditures of funds on activities producing knowledge capital,
such as work on improving research techniques and instruments; on
making fundamental scientific advances in practically important
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fields not otherwise supported; and on building up bodies of broadly
useful background data.
Thus, the operation of the subsystem of government agricultural
research depends significantly not only on the internal organization
of the system and on the arrangements affecting the way its clientele
can influence research decisions, but also on the set of standards and
beliefs that guide farmers in the exercise of their powers.
So far as I know, little systematic empirical research has been done
on the facets of government agricultural research discussed here,
though there appear to be a number of possibilities. The role of econ-
omic conditions in affecting the selection of directions of research
could be studied by making interregional, intertemporal and even
international comparisons of responses to various economic and
other conditions. In addition, there are possibilities for comparisons
between different R and D subsystems. For example, what are the
differences between industrial and government research on similar
problems in agricultural engineering or in the utilization of agricultural
products? How does research in veterinary medicine compare with
that in human medicine? Using a model like that sketched here may
help in the design of such research.
Conclusions
Our exploration of some society-wide R and D institutions suggests
certain general conclusions. First, I think it is evident that R and D
includes a variety of nationwide institutional systems which are not
only descriptively different but also functionally different in the pat-
terns of R and D they generate. Second, it appears possible to develop
models of the operation of these systems analogous to the models
that economic theory provides for the competitive price system and
its variants. Third, such models would be useful in guiding empirical
research, in explaining the directions taken by R and D, and in
evaluating the efficiency of alternative institutional arrangements for
the performance of different R and D tasks.
Viewed more broadly, this paper has tried to apply the general
approach of economics to the analysis of the organization and opera-
tion of institutional systems which differ considerably from those
usually studied by economists. In this respect, it is similar to the work
of Downs and Dahi and Lindblom on politico-economic
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, 1957 and Robert
A. Dahi and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, New York, 1953.
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and to the work of Simon on hierarchic formal organizations.38 The
work of these writers suggests that it may be possible to develop
theories that will enable us to explore the relations between (1) organi-
zational structure, (2) type of task, (3) environmental conditions, and
(4) task performance for a wider variety of institutional arrangements
than are usually considered in economic analysis. It seems to me that
the study of R and D provides both an incentive and an opportunity
for broadening still further our knowledge of alternative institutional
systems for the performance of social tasks.
COMMENT
JOSEPH J. SPENGLER, Duke University
Robert Merrill focuses attention upon the manner in which R and
D is organized and directed within those subsystems of our societal
system in which nonmarket forces play a major role and actual and
prospective monetary profits supposedly play a relatively small part.
Two types of subsystems are examined: theoretical science, in which
practical application is not emphasized, and applied science, in
which the major emphasis is put upon practical application (as, for
example, in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and engineering).
It is assumed that, within each of these subsystems, the direction
given to inventive activity depends very largely upon three conditions:
(1) the alternatives considered; (2) the consequences associated with
each alternative; and (3) "the 'preferences' or 'values' used to.judge
the desirability of the various alternative-consequence combinations."
Attention is focused upon the last of these three presumably because,
in the absence of a monetary common denominator to measure gross
costs and gross benefits, some sort of indicator, albeit ill-defined, is
required if one is to choose among alternatives. By contrast, the
management of a business firm, when confronted by alternatives with
which consequences are associated, usually would attempt to trans-
late both alternatives and consequences into continua of estimated
monetary costs and estimated monetary returns. Having allowed for
the uncertainties involved, it would then choose an alternative and
pursue it roughly up to the point where its pursuit paid no better
than that of any other available choice. By such action the business
firm would maximize its return above costs, given the inputs at its
38JamesC. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations,NewYork, 1958.
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disposal and the time horizon in terms of which decisions affecting
profits are made. Of course if, as organization theory postulates, the
"welfare function" of the firm includes other elements besides those
immediately affecting net return over cost, the management would
take these elements into account also; nonetheless its assessment and
balancing of alternatives and consequences would run predominantly
in terms of monetary costs and benefits.
It seems to be assumed that the set of alternatives available for
consideration is essentially given. There is not much allowance, there-
fore, for the fact that decision makers, by their current actions, can
or will substantially alter the set of alternatives confronting them in
the future. Consequently the analysis of decision making within the
subsystems studied seems to run largely in terms of the short run and
to be based upon the assumption that the decision maker cannot
significantly modify the environment of alternatives to which he is
responding.
I find myself hard pressed to put behavior within any of these sub-
systems on a par with behavior in a profit dominated economy. I
cannot find in any of the subsystems a clear-cut analogue of the price
system which serves to organize and equilibrate the profit dominated
behavior of all the private business firms composing the economy.
Nor do I find enough analogues to the business firm which continu-
ally acts to maximize profits or some more composite success indica-
tor, given actual and prospective buying, selling, and accounting
prices, together with the particular industrial setting in which it finds
itself. Even though one postulates the alternatives present in a sub-
system, one needs to identify the specific decision makers together
with the constraints faced by each and the organizational arrange-
ment that binds these decision makers into a subsystem and somehow
distributes scarce resources among them in a manner making for the
stability and perpetuity of the subsystem.
Before turning to Merrill's analysis of particular subsystems, several
implications of his study should be noted. By definition, that part of the
realm of theoretical science which is not dominated by profit seeking
firms is largely removed from the control of market forces, subject
to the constraint that virtually all of the inputs utilized in theoretical
science are scarce and hence must be rationed. By definition, also, any
practical-art realm is much more dominated by market forces than is
any theoretical realm, for the tastes and demands which a practical art
subserves are largely shaped by market factors and by a considerable
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awareness of the opportunity costs involved in any particular course
of action. Of course, one subsystem of the practical art sort may be
more shaped by market forces than is some other.
I turn now to Merrill's analysis of the direction of R and D within
the realm of theoretical science. Control is exercised largely by scien-
tists participating in the particular cultural traditions of science and
bent upon promoting "the aims and values embodied in this tradition."
Science is organized, not by prices, but by the "professional judgments
of achieved and expected performance" which are based upon "cul-
turally transmitted standards of scientific significance and value."
The overriding standard is described as that of deepening our under-
standing of nature, or of maximizing our advance in knowledge.
Accordingly, interest and resources tend to be shifted, at the margin,
to fields of science in which something is happening, that is, to fields
in which new findings or methods have given rise to "new and wider
opportunities for achieving greater precision or profundity" and for
extending an affected field's systematic relevance and increasing its
intrinsic interest. "Practical interest" is a subsidiary source of attrac-
tion.
Unfortunately, Merrill does not present supporting empirical evi-
dence but instead counts heavily upon M. Polanyi's arguments. He
does, of course, note that European scientists set greater value upon
purely academic science than do American scientists, presumably
because of differences in cultural tradition. One might argue, however,
that a comparative scarcity of resources for relatively expensive
practically oriented research may also be influential; after all, such
scarcity helps account for the relative importance, in poor countries,
of more cheaply produced training in the humanities and legal science.
Three allocative levels seem to be involved, though Merrill does not
specifically identify the inputs relevant at each level: (1) recruitment
of scientists into a given field of science; (2) recruitment of practitioners
in a given field of science into a particular area of that field; and
(3) allocation of auxiliary inputs among the scientists engaged at any
given time in the various fields and sub-fields of science. One must
become a physicist (instead of an economist) before one can become
a solid-state physicist and, having become a solid-state physicist, one
must get the auxiliary inputs if one is to carry on effectively. The
standards emphasized by Merrill seem to be most applicable at level
(3); they are not very applicable at level (1), and only modestly so
at level (2). In any event, the comparative availability of funds (or
436WITHIN A SOCIETY
resources) for remuneration and research will have much to do with
whether a college graduate commits himself to some given field of
science; it will also affect his choice of a specialty. One might discover
the ailocative forces operative by sampling and classifying scientists
by major scientific category, specialty, age, type of institution with
which connected, interspecialty shifts (if any), and principal reasons
for choice of major category of science and of specialty within it. I
incline to the view that awareness of differences in economic pros-
pects, together with the ready availability of opportunities for advanc-
ed study (which also are economically determined), has much to do
with the choice made.
The standards emphasized by Merrill seem most applicable at level
(3) and within given fields. Even so, their influence is subject to re-
striction. When funds are not earmarked for particular fields, a
certain amount of conventional egalitarianism affects their alloca-
tion; it is considered "unfair" to give "too much" to certain fields
even though a strong case may be made for so doing. When funds
are earmarked, activities tend to expand most rapidly in those areas
in which earmarked funds expand most rapidly. In either situation
it is likely, of course, that the amount of support given particular
kinds of projects will be greater than otherwise if the instruments
these projects produce are likely to be of use on other projects; then in-
vestment in the former set of projects results in external economies.
In the second part of his paper, Merrill examines research and devel-
opment in terms both of its application to the solution of specific
problems and of its use in the general improvement of a practical art.
Three practical arts, medicine, agriculture, and engineering, are
examined. Criteria of practical usefulness are held to operate in the
field of medical research as well as in that of government-sponsored
agricultural research, particularly in the selection of specific problems
for solution. This is true also in engineering but in that field one also
finds a considerable institutionalization and utilization of resources
to improve engineering in general, seemingly more than in the field
of medicine which draws upon a larger number of specialized sciences.
Within the field of medicine the direction given research is domi-
nated by professional standards incorporated in the tradition of
medical science; it is in light of these standards that the comparative
importance of medical needs and the degree of their satisfaction is
assessed. Because findings are promptly publicized they are expedi-
tiously evaluated, as are the research techniques, and the like, associ-
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ated with them. Even so, nonscientific determinants may also be
operative; for example, the attitudes of patients sometimes affect
applied medical research and the same is true of foundation financing,
be it rational or otherwise. It is questionable, of course, whether
standards used to define what is good medical practice have much to
do with how investigators are recruited or with how resources are
allocated among them. The prospect of economic advantage probably
plays a major part in determining what research is undertaken. Care-
ful inquiry might disclose what particular tastes and interests animate
those whose funds help give direction, be it economically warranted
or not, to medical research.
Applied research and development in the field of government
sponsored agricultural research is largely controlled by governmental
agencies. The criterion of prospective economic usefulness appears
to determine what is to be done. It is not disclosed how this criterion
is applied. Nor is it disclosed whether the criterion of usefulness is
better defined and more closely conformed to in this field than in that
of medical research in which, at least until recently, the role of govern-
ment has been small.
Engineering is described as less influenced by scientific specialists
than is medicine and, also, as far more completely under the influence
of profit seeking firms, inasmuch as they employ most of the engineers
engaged in R and D. Some support is given to basic research, princi-
pally by larger firms and a few research-oriented engineering schools.
It is noted, however, that the increasing capacity of theoretical en-
gineering research to give rise to widely applicable results as well as
to contribute to the generalimprovementof engineering is making for
greater support of basic research.
Merrill does not report which of the three practical arts considered
is most closely oriented to the market and hence most under its
influence. Engineering appears to be the most market-dominated of
the three, with government-sponsored agricultural research second,
and medical research third. In the field of engineering, the market
seems largely to determine how much money is available for research
and the uses to which it is put. In the field of agricultural research, the
market influences what is done in far greater measure than it influ-
ences how much is done. The same is true of medicine but to a lesser
extent.
In each of these three fields one might endeavor to determine the
extent to which the market governs what research is undertaken,
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and then seek to explain the residuum in noneconomic terms. This
approach, if it could be carried out, would provide us with a better
estimate of the relative importance of nonmarket factors than we pre-
sently have. It might also disclose the role of market forces to be quite
important even when nonmarket forces are supposed to be playing
the major role. After all, as Pareto and Marshall and others have
suggested, market forces sometimes resemble icebergs in that much
of their influence is exercised from submerged situations and, hence,
hidden from superficial examination.
The basic problem with which Merrill deals requires further analy-
tical clarification. (I) Each subsystem, together with its allocative
machinery, must be defined and bounded. (2) Values must be separ-
ated into those present within a subsystem (where they may constrain
the operation of the allocative machinery) and those present outside
the subsystem. The values outside the subsystem must be classified in
turn into those which are largely shaped within the market (e.g. ordin-
ary consumer tastes) or outside the market (e.g. those that generate
dispositions to supply funds for defense and offense, space travel,
specialized medical research, etc.). (3) The sources of the personnel
and other resources available to any particular subsystem must be
carefully identified, as must the circumstances which govern this
availability through time. (4) The levels at which the allocation of
personnel and inputs takes place need to be differentiated.
Given analytical distinctions of the sort indicated, it will be found
that most of the personnel and resources available to any of the sub-
systems treated by Merrill flow in from the outside. They do so largely
in consequence of values generated outside the subsystem, either
within the market or outside the market. Furthermore, even when
these values have been originated and organized outside the market
(e.g. by the action of special interest groups expressed through
government agencies or private foundations), their realization is
accomplished through the market. Funds are made available and
individuals and auxiliary equipment are "hired" to accomplish the
objective ends to which the values point. These individuals and equip-
ment could not otherwise be engaged to objectify the values in ques-
tion; for only very rarely will individuals engage in a line of activity
irrespective of the remuneration offered and the other alternatives
available. Moreover, even within a subsystem, material advantage
will be largely counted upon to attract men and materials to one sector
and from others. In sum, advocates of given courses of research
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action must rely largely upon the use of material rewards; for, as
Rochefoucauld implied, material self-interest usually swallows up
virtue. What is most in need of explanation is why certain courses of
action come to be preferred by given individuals and how those
individuals go about the business of raising the material means with
which to induce competent persons to implement such courses of
action.
440